The Conceit of Enterprise: train operators and trade narrative

CRESC Response to ATOC’s ‘Growth and Prosperity’ Report

Andrew Bowman, Peter Folkman, Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal, John Law, Adam Leaver, Michael Moran, Karel Williams

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Summary: About This Response

The train operators have countered CRESC’s Great Train Robbery, a critical TUC sponsored research report. Richard Branson defended Virgin’s record in a Guardian column and ATOC, the train operators’ Trade Association, weighed in with its own report Growth and Prosperity based on KPMG research.

CRESC’s rejoinder “The conceit of enterprise” now argues that the result is dispute without debate. Because the train operators defend themselves by restating what we call a “trade narrative” (pp.5-6) about how private operators deliver social benefits. This is part of a much larger political problem about how privatisation and out sourcing entrenches corporate players with self-serving narratives that overestimate their contribution (pp.25-26).

ATOC, like Richard Branson, emphasise how direct subsidies for operators have declined but do not engage with CRESC’s original arguments about how low track access charges provide a large indirect subsidy to all train operator (pp.16-18) within a dysfunctional system where the state and the taxpayer fund rail investment and guarantees Network Rail’s increasingly unsustainable debt mountain.

Instead the operators divert onto claiming that it is their marketing effort rather than GDP growth which drives increasing passenger numbers. As our rejoinder points this claim is doubtful (pp.8-10) and flatly contradicted by ATOC’s own lobbying demand that train operators should be compensated for GDP fluctuations which constitute an uncontrolled risk (p.9).
More fundamentally, the train operators emphasise that their dividends are modest and return on sales is lower than in supermarkets. But they do not confront the existential issue of why we need private train operators who receive large subsidies, invest almost no capital and take very little risk because they can and do walk away from loss making franchises with modest penalties and no claw back.

Contrary to Richard Branson’s claims, over the 15 years life of the West Coast franchise, Virgin is hugely subsidy dependent. Net direct subsidy alone amounts to nearly £2 billion (p. 18) and indirect subsidy through low track access charges has increased in recent years as direct subsidy declines (p. 20). These subsidies have allowed £460 million to be paid out as dividends (p. 18).

The report aggregates the results of all the private train operators (p. 15—and reproduced below) and shows they have just £219 million of capital employed on which they earn a pre-tax ROCE of 121.8% (whereas publicly funded Network Rail has £36 billion of capital employed on which it has a wafer thin return of 1.34%).

What train operators will not admit is that it is easy to make distributable profit (or exit with modest penalties when the economy turns down) in an industry where the tax payer provides the capital and operating subsidy.
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**Introduction**

“The franchising model has enabled train companies to generate significant financial returns for the Government, played a crucial role in delivering unprecedented growth in journey numbers, and provided passengers with improved services and better value.”

_Growth and Prosperity, Page 29, Association of Train Operating Companies, July 2013._

“You’ve got to accentuate the positive,
Eliminate the negative,
Latch on to the affirmative
Don’t mess with Mister In Between”

Johnny Mercer, _pop standard lyric, 1944._

The TUC published CRESC’s public interest report, _The Great Train Robbery_, in June 2013 in order to encourage debate about the public interest issues around rail finance. The report offered the first comprehensive account of how public subsidies and guarantees have created a rail system which operates through subsidy ‘churnaround’. The requirement for railway subsidy is driven by the basic fact that passenger revenues do not even cover operating costs, let alone investment. But then the structure of the privatised railway industry means that those subsidies are churned around the system from one location to another. This movement obscures the extent and the form of subsidies and gives private train operators an option on distributable profit while losses and debts are absorbed by quasi-public Network Rail. The unsustainable and rapidly increasing debt of £30 billion accumulated by Network Rail is a liability guaranteed by the taxpayer.

The report’s criticism of the Train Operating Companies (TOCs) was reported by Aditya Chakrabortty in the _Guardian_. This provoked a personal response from Richard Branson, headlined “hard work, not handouts, put Virgin trains on the right track”, which disputed the CRESC interpretation. The Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) riposted in a more corporate manner by publishing its own report, _Growth and Prosperity_, based on research commissioned from KPMG. Without mentioning the CRESC report, ATOC told a different story summarised in its report subtitle: “how franchising helped transform the railway into a British success story”. At the same time the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) published its long-term

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regulatory statement, *Opportunities & challenges for the railway,* which gave an official view of the state of our railways.³

So there is a debate about the organisation and financing of our railway network. That’s the good news. That is what we were hoping for when we wrote *The Great Train Robbery.* But now the bad news. Where have we got to in that debate? The answer is, not so very far. The ORR knows that there’s a potential problem. How will Network Rail service its debt? The ORR’s answer is that it will depend on direct government support, and long-term investor confidence. And it thereby ducks the question of sustainability while adding that ‘[t]he burden on future generations to pay for the costs of historic investment will continue to rise as Network Rail’s debt grows to fund further investment.’ (p. 34) Branson and ATOC both avoid this investment issue completely and instead focus on the operating contribution being made by the supposed managerial initiative and enterprise of the Train Operating Companies. They don’t engage with CRESC’s broader account of the public interest issues about rail funding and the growth of public liabilities. Instead, they choose to restate an existing storyline about private turnaround. The latter, they tell us, is due to the good work of the Train Operating Companies.

This line of defence is part of a new style of post-1980s politics that works by framing sectoral stories in a very specific way. Private business now represents itself in what we might think of as ‘trade narratives’. Trade narratives describe how the good work by private firms in a specific sector creates public benefit. Indeed, they *take it for granted* that this is the case. So the basic good news story-line is always the same and the sub text is that private provision is needed if we are to secure the public good. The trade narrative is nuanced because it can make space for the idea that private providers compete to do the job better than others: think of the 2012 contest between Virgin Rail and FirstGroup for the West Coast Main Line franchise. This means that the narrative is capable of generating debate or controversy. But even as the protagonists squabble, it is written into its basic assumptions that private provision of public goods is what is needed. There is no space in the story-line for anything different. Political or economic discussion of alternatives is choked off. Problems that don’t fit with the story-line disappear from view. This is what is now happening with the ATOC and Branson rejoinder to the CRESC report. Network Rail’s growing indebtedness? It doesn’t begin to get a look-in.

Perhaps we should not be surprised. Major institutions and organisations (public and private alike) are always reluctant to accept and take responsibility for any harm they might have done. There is nothing unprecedented or unexpected about the recent prevarications of the British NHS on unsafe hospitals. But since Thatcher and Reagan something new has happened. A world

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in which corporate business now provides public services is also a world in which those providers have sharpened their narrative skills – in the form of trade narratives. We learn again and again that public good depends on private business through trade narratives which are different in various sectors but use similar strategies and devices. The general strategy is, as in Johnny Mercer’s pop standard lyric, to accentuate the positive and eliminate the negative. This approach always leaves much undisclosed and unexplained because the brightly-lit foreground of positives includes black boxes whose internal operations are unexamined against a shadowy background of opaque processes. Where negatives cannot be denied or glossed over they are excused in various ways so that they either don’t count as big negatives, or they become somebody else’s fault. Of course, all stories work by imposing order and all knowledge works with an undisclosed, but the problem with trade narratives is that the adopt Johnny Mercer’s “accentuate the positive” principle of constructing relations and selecting facts. So there are the things that we predictably don’t learn about. Trade narratives don’t tell us about the downsides. They don’t tell us about the problems. They don’t talk about the places where private interests don’t line up with the public good. In short, they limit public debate, and they frame it in particular and restricting ways.

All of this is dangerous. But it is especially damaging in sectors such as finance or railways in which the profits of private corporations are levered on the state to the disadvantage of citizens and tax payers. It is even more dangerous if the system that has grown up is also unsustainable. Many would concur that the present organisation of the finance sector cannot be sustained. But the same is true, too, for the railways. At some point in the next decade the cost of servicing Network Rail’s borrowing will lead to crisis that has to be resolved by passing liabilities on to the tax payer. But in the meanwhile the stories told by the Train Operating Companies ignore this reality. Instead they tell us about their own excellence. These trade narratives are conceits in the exact OED sense of the word. They reflect the private sector’s “overweening opinion” of itself and an “overestimation of its own qualities”

The conceit in rail takes the classic form of a trade narrative in which the private provider claims all the credit for and exaggerates social benefits, while simultaneously denying or ignoring any social costs: as in other sectors, private firms are always the heroic transformers. The rail narrative is about turnaround delivering (net) payments to government and more journeys by satisfied passengers; just as the finance sector’s trade narrative is about its social contribution through taxes paid and employment created. Both deal in half-truths confected from decontextualized facts and implying causal relations that would not be endorsed by independent researchers. This isn’t surprising. The empirical support for trade narratives in railways, finance or other sectors is provided by consultancies whose brief is to find and measure social benefits that will put private interests in a favourable light. This kind of “all benefits, no costs” analysis makes it a democratic duty to contest such trade narratives. And this is why we have written this rejoinder. In the next section we question ATOC’s story about the achievement of the TOCs in increasing passenger numbers and contributing to the

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Exchequer. Then we consider Richard Branson’s claims about a single enterprising train operating company, West Coast Trains. We treat the trade association and the entrepreneur separately because they develop the turnaround story of private success in different ways. The ATOC report fights numbers with numbers, while Branson fights numbers with imagery about one Train Operating Company on a “mission impossible”.

**ATOCP on “the significant contribution” of franchising**

“This original research underlines the significant contribution rail franchising has made in reversing the industry’s fortunes, delivering exceptional journey growth and substantial passenger benefits”

*(Tim O’Toole, CEO of First Group in his foreword to the ATOC report)*

The ATOC report provides a generalised and sober version of the turnaround story which is aimed at Whitehall and Westminster where the trade association needs to be taken seriously by the civil servants and politicians who set the rules of the franchising game. This is why ATOC commissioned KPMG to do research that would more securely establish the connection between the TOC’s enterprising management and social benefits. The benefits mentioned include increasing numbers of journeys and increased customer satisfaction. The broader claim is that operators are “generating more revenues [and] helping to reduce public subsidies and sustain investment while earning modest operating margins”. KPMG’s report takes the form of empirics and argument that support what the Train Operating Companies behind ATOC want to believe.

So what is the problem? The answer is that KPMG’s story accentuates the positive and eliminates the negative in an intellectually opportunistic and trade-framed way which (as we will argue) also unintentionally exposes the weakness of ATOC’s position. The report is opportunistic because it displays inadequate intellectual caution in the way it selects and slices evidence as it seeks to prove its point about causal relations and performance outcomes. Indeed – we'll come to this in a moment – such is its zeal in seeking out evidence that fits what it wants to say that it makes claims that flatly contradict what ATOC is saying in other contexts. And the report is trade-framed – and therefore flawed – because it focuses on positive issues such as customer satisfaction or dividend extraction, where the TOCs can look good, while misrepresenting the relations between subsidies and TOC contributions to government revenues. Overall the effect is to exaggerate the TOC’s social contribution in ways that discourage sensible debate about rail funding and the social costs of privatized rail in terms of accumulating public liabilities.

On causal relations, the major issue in dispute is whether the TOCs can claim the credit for increasing passenger numbers. On this, the CRESC *Great Train Robbery* report argues that claims from ATOC that train operators should take the credit are highly questionable. First, passenger numbers were increasing before privatisation. But second, there are three key drivers that have nothing to do with the quality of TOC services: the long-term growth of GDP;
an increase in commuting in the South East; and the increase in motoring costs over the period in question. All of these could all be expected to have a major impact on the attractiveness of rail. At the same time, we concluded our discussion of drivers in that report by stressing the limits to existing knowledge and saying that: “a larger and more detailed research study is required if the aim is to unpack all the drivers of increasing rail passenger numbers since the mid-1980s.”

The complexity of the drivers of passenger train travel is noted by David Higgins, Chief Executive of Network Rail. Higgins emphasises the “key role” of train operators in his foreword to the ATOC report but adds that:

“[Journey] growth is driven by a multitude of factors. Social and economic changes within Britain have a big role to play. As more jobs are located in city centres but people’s homes are in suburbs, or even different towns, commuting has increased markedly. The growing role of communications technology in our everyday lives also means that people have wider social networks and are more likely to travel to visit friends and family who don’t live nearby. Alongside these changes to the way people live and work, the cost of fuel, running a car and road congestion all impact on the number of people who travel by rail.”

The problem is that ATOC (and KPMG) want to claim all the credit for the train operators before the research is done. This means that they beg the question in ways that prejudge the answer about what is driving rail’s success. KPMG write:

“... if external demand drivers and other factors cannot alone explain rail’s success, what part has been played by franchising where train operations are focused on delivering what customers want?”

ATOC and their members believe the KPMG report vindicates their answer. First Group chief executive Tim O’Toole writes in his foreword:

“How did this happen? How do policy makers distinguish causation from correlation? This report, based on data collated and analysed by KPMG, provides important evidence to demonstrate the essential role franchising and private sector operators have played in the success of the past 20 years.”

But, those who read the text closely will find that the report does not establish that “success” would have been impossible without franchising. The first and most obvious issue in the report is KPMG’s use of evidence on the causal relation between GDP growth and passenger numbers – we’ll come to this in a moment. The second is the gross contradiction about causal relations that we touched on above. The ATOC report plays down the importance of GDP as a driver of passenger numbers. But exactly the opposite is claimed when ATOC goes into lobbying mode about the terms of franchise agreements. Wearing another hat, the trade association has argued that franchisees should be compensated for fluctuations in GDP because these are a driver of revenue fluctuation and risk that lie beyond the control of the TOCs. So that is the argument. But what does the evidence – incomplete though it may be – actually suggest? Did
GDP growth drive the increase in rail passenger journeys, or was it the management of the train operators?

The first decade of privatisation coincided with the longest post-war period of sustained economic growth and correlated with an increase in the number of commuters and in the number of leisure trips. If the aim is to unpack causality, we would argue that time series evidence should be presented for the whole of the relevant period so that readers can inspect trends and make their own calculations for sub-periods. This was what we will do later in this rejoinder when considering the numbers for West Coast Trains (Exhibits 3, 4 and 5). And this was also what we did in the Great Train Robbery report when we presented GDP growth and rail passenger journeys with all the time series data on both in a single 30 year chart. This is reproduced below as Exhibit 1 which shows how changes in rail journeys have been highly sensitive to changes in GDP.

KPMG did not do this. Instead they sliced the data into 14 year sub-periods in a way that makes moving trends and relationships between GDP and rail growth invisible. In their pre-privatisation sub-period, GDP grew 53 per cent and rail journeys by 33 per cent, whereas in the post-privatisation sub period, GDP grew 33 per cent and rail journeys by 73 per cent. KPMG then conclude that “the correlation between the two is far from complete”. But they are only able to make this claim because of their choice of sub-periods. The correlation is far stronger than they are suggesting.

Exhibit 1: Percentage change in GDP vs. change in rail passenger journeys

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5 Source: ORR / DfT / IMF.
As we noted above, there is another irony, this time about the contradictions between the stories told by ATOC to different audiences for different purposes. As we have just seen, in its trade narrative where it talks up the social benefits of franchising, ATOC’s position is that GDP growth plays no major role in driving rail passenger journeys. But in its lobbying efforts where it reflects the private interests of its members in minimising risk, ATOC has argued that franchise agreements should contain compensation for GDP fluctuation. Why? Because changes in GDP lead to changes in TOC revenue that are beyond the control of the TOCs, because GDP changes drive passenger numbers. Thus if we turn from the KPMG report to the ATOC web site, we find documents which imply or assert these relations as part of an argument about uncontrollable macro risk. In its 2010 publication Franchise reform and better value for money in rail we read that:

“ATOC believes better risk-sharing is vital both to promote stability in the industry and to build long-term value. We identify seven options, including an earlier start to revenue support in a franchise, linking franchise payments to GDP…” (Page 8)

And in another 2009 ATOC report, Franchise Reform a better railway for passengers and for taxpayers they argue for the:

“Indexation of franchise payments according to the rate of change (up or down) of GDP over the previous 12 months. This is in effect a variation of revenue support particularly focused on providing a better structure to handle major economic downturns, a risk that the franchisee cannot control…” (page 18)

The Appendix of the report adds that:

“Since passenger demand and GDP for most franchises are thought to be quite closely correlated (at least over the long term), this would increase the chance a franchise could withstand a serious recession (a risk that the TOC cannot control)” (page 24)

So the lobbying story about private risk is quite different from the trade narrative about public benefit. But note, too, that the trade association’s lobbying proposal is for indexation over 12 months; we believe there would be uproar from ATOC members if the proposed indexation was to be over 14 year periods chosen by KPMG. Note also that as a result of successful lobbying, the new franchise payment and subsidy mechanisms are now responsive to GDP. A question then suggests itself: since the KPMG report comes to the opposite conclusion, will ATOC now campaign for the GDP mechanism to be struck out of franchising agreements so that the taxpayer can save money when GDP next turns down? If not, then the trade narrative is hypocrisy.

The trade narrative is created to reflect what ATOC wants to believe about the positive benefits of franchising, so KPMG’s slicing of evidence and neglect of contradiction on GDP and rail journeys is not so much a momentary lapse, as a defining characteristic of the report. Consider,

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7 Association of Train Operating Companies, Franchise Reform a better railway for passengers and for taxpayers, 2009 http://www.atoc.org/clientfiles/files/FutureFranchisesReport_AW.PDF
for example, the importance of London and the South East in driving the growth in passenger journeys. In the Great Train Robbery report we presented figures from the ORR showing that just under two thirds of the increase in rail passenger journeys since 2002/3 – the earliest we could get data split by region and journey type – came from London and the South East (Exhibit 61. p. 117). It might well be the case that without the peculiar dynamics of the South East (rising house prices, longer commutes, congestion charging etc.), the growth figures would not have looked so good. ATOC and KPMG claim that because the growth of peak hour travel into and out of London has been below overall levels of growth, there is no London effect. We don’t know why they choose to consider London alone and not the South East more broadly, but it is worth noting that rail use has historically been far higher in and around London than the rest of the country (regional and long distance operators have accounted for only 30 per cent of passenger journeys over the past decade). This means that a little growth around London contributes a lot of growth to the aggregate.

The contradiction between trade narrative and lobbying objectives surfaces again in ATOC’s argument about the role of London and the South East. Because London and the South East are so important, ATOC suggested in the 2010 report cited above that a central London employment index could be an additional option to relieve risk for the TOCs (page 9). The view certainly appears to be held by some ATOC members. Here, for example, is Stagecoach invoking GDP and London employment as uncontrollable risks:

“The revenue earned by UK train operating companies is historically correlated with macroeconomic factors such as UK GDP and Central London Employment. Accordingly revenue can vary significantly due to factors outside the control of the train operating companies”.

Overall, as the ATOC argument progresses, it becomes increasingly clear that KPMG is snatching whatever apparent support it can find for its prejudged view, and doing so on the assumption that readers will not consult and check against original sources. For instance, using data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS), we argued in The Great Train Robbery that the growth in rail journeys owed something to the faster increase in costs of motoring. From ONS sources, the costs of petrol and oil, motor vehicle maintenance, motor vehicle insurance and tax (the three major motoring expenses included in the Retail Price Index), had all risen considerably faster than rail fares since the beginning of privatisation (Exhibit 62, p.117). So how do ATOC and KPMG work? The answer is that instead of citing data from the ONS directly, they use data from a report published by the RAC in 2012, which they say shows that rail journeys “cannot be explained by car usage becoming more expensive”. We were unable to locate the data reproduced by KPMG in the RAC report, and it is very important to note that the original RAC report did not make such a bold, black-and-white claim. Instead the original report makes use of the ONS index figures we referred to and notes that:

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“Rail mileage has grown most rapidly for business purposes – it has nearly tripled – and there is some evidence of a partial shift of business travel from company car to rail for men.”

The report also highlights interesting corollary issues such as correspondence between the sharp drop-off in company car commuter travel – particularly into London – and the growth in rail travel, major declines in company car ownership in large urban areas, the decline in car use among young men, and the more rapid growth in rail travel among those without a full driving licence. Again, since there is strategic silence on these issues in the ATOC report, it appears that evidence is being picked to support pre-determined conclusions.

The KPMG report for ATOC is similarly opportunistic in its treatment of performance indicators and outcomes. The tactic is to try to close down the framing in a way that suits ATOC’s trade narrative before snatching decontextualized figures to buttress that narrative. As the TOCs claim, it is indeed the case that customer satisfaction is at an all-time high based on survey evidence. But the rail sector’s composite measures of satisfaction conceal as much as they reveal. As we noted in *The Great Train Robbery* report (pp. 124-127), the questions used for the Passenger Focus surveys define satisfaction by framing it in consumerist terms about service quality. We accept that these survey results can be appropriately used to establish whether passengers think their train is clean and the staff polite. This is no doubt desirable. However, they cannot be used to support the conclusion that British citizens think the current privatised rail system is preferable to alternatives. The latter question is simply not being asked. Social or political questions to do with the organisation of the rail network do not appear in passenger surveys. This isn’t what they are about. So where might we look if we want to think about the politics of the railways? One answer is – opinion polls. And as our *Great Train Robbery* report notes, such polls have on several occasions reveal that a majority of the British public favour the renationalisation of the railways.

This is partly because there is widespread public dissatisfaction with fares and pricing structures. Surveys from Passenger Focus (p.126) reveal dissatisfaction with value for money partly because many passengers feel they are ‘forced into paying higher prices’ by the yield management systems of the ATOCs which offer cheap fares at inconvenient times; while commuters and prime time business passengers question the obverse principle which is charging whatever the market will bear – or however much the government will allow – for those who have to travel at particular times. How does ATOC handle this? The answer is that it doesn’t. Instead of confronting this social issue about the conflict between public demands for access and private business models of yield management, it focuses on the offer of cheap advance purchase fares which show, for example, that 75 per cent of people travel from London to Manchester for less than £49.00. This has certainly enabled train companies to keep average costs of travel per mile relatively flat. But the practice of offering cheap, inflexible

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tickets at inconvenient times also massively diminishes the social utility of rail for many in lower income groups and dumps the burden of cost recovery onto peak time travellers.

Much the same point about opportunistic research could be made about European comparisons which are included when they work for the ATOC narrative, but are quietly dropped when they do not. Thus, research from Just Economics which we cited in the Great Train Robbery (pp. 119-120) suggests that key average fares in the UK are substantially more expensive than in other major European nations. On this point, KPMG provides no European comparisons. Instead the report notes that growth in UK rail passenger journeys is larger than those in other key European economies such as France and Germany. Taken out of context this sounds good. However, on closer inspection it is not clear what the comparison shows. Does faster growth in the UK reflect the peculiar decline of UK rail passenger numbers in the mid-20th century that was caused by underinvestment and policies to encourage the use of cars at the expense of rail? Have factors such as motoring costs affected the attractiveness of rail transport differently in various European countries? And, most fundamentally, if key UK drivers of rail growth are exogenous (like GDP) then passenger number increases do not vindicate the UK rail system of private ownership and franchising.

The implication is that KPMG plays fast and loose with the evidence as it tries to confirm ATOC’s trade narrative about the many positives that come from the good work of train operators. But here at least, most of the evidence is in the public domain and what we have is a straightforward difference of interpretation between ATOC and ourselves – a disagreement that is often about causal relations, about what has caused the growth in passenger travel. When it comes to the issues around value extraction and public subsidy, the ATOC report is more subtly politicised by the requirements of trade narrative. Here KPMG prefers to accentuate the positive and keeps the discussion on safe ground by talking about modest dividend extraction by the TOCs and declining direct public subsidy for the TOCs. It does not confront the awkward issues about indirect subsidy which have always been in the shadow of the trade narrative. As we noted above, our Great Train Robbery report argues that undisclosed and indirect subsidy via low tuck access for the TOCs has increased as direct subsidies have diminished; and the consequence has been a boost to the profitability of the TOCs while tens of billions of taxpayer liabilities have been and continue to accumulate in quasi-public Network Rail.

On the question of dividend extraction by Train Operating Companies, the authors of the KPMG report behave rather like generals fighting the last war. The ATOC press release of 10 July 2013 introducing the KPMG report contained only one set of figures, covering two snap-shot years (1997-8 and 2011-12) which seem to show that the TOCs made a modest surplus over costs while their contribution to government had increased.10 This fits with ATOC’s trade narrative that the TOCs are now positive contributors because they pay more to government in franchise

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premia than they claim as (direct) subsidy from government. This is a reply to an earlier form of criticism to privatised rail which added up the totals for dividends extracted and argued that all would be well with railways if they were brought back into public ownership. The Great Train Robbery report did not argue against privatisation in this way. Instead it took a more practical line by identifying long-standing problems with rail funding. These, it said, arise from the business model of recovering costs from users. Under public and private ownership since the 1940s, rail fares have never covered operating costs and investment requirements, and adding or removing dividend extractions makes no difference to this fundamental social problem.

The CRESC report is in explicit agreement with the KPMG report that TOC dividend extractions are “modest”. Indeed, this was the exact word we used in our report (p. 29) to describe the £160 million of dividends paid out by TOCs in 2010-11 which we calculated as 2.1% on turnover (p. 30). This fits with KPMG’s calculation for 2010-11 of the TOCs 3.1% operating margin on turnover (KPMG, p. 13). What we disagree about is therefore not the figures, but whether this is a fair and necessary reward for private management services rendered by the TOCs.

The standard measure of return is usually return on capital employed (ROCE) because that is the basis on which any portfolio or direct investor would compare investment opportunities. The KPMG report avoids ROCE calculations, and opportunistically claims that supermarkets earn margins of around 5% on turnover, which are higher than the 3% earned by the TOCs. But that glosses over a fundamental difference between TOCs and supermarkets. The supermarkets are in a stores and stocks business where they have large amounts of capital tied up in their businesses, whereas TOCs are what we called “fee for service” companies. This is because the investments they make are negligible (p. 80). They don’t have capital invested in the tracks that their trains run on. And they don’t have capital invested in those trains either. They rent their rolling-stock from ROSCOs (Rolling Stock Operating Companies) and they rent the right to run those trains from Network Rail.

Exhibit 2 presents the relevant evidence on returns on turnover and capital for 2011-12. These will make most readers distinctly queasy about what the rail regulator is doing to protect the public interest. The big three British-owned supermarkets (Tesco, Sainsbury and Morrisons) have £42.7 billion of capital invested in their business, and their pre-tax profit on turnover of 3.4% translates into a return on capital of just 8.5% which is towards the bottom end of what the stock market requires from utility type operations. Compare this with the 22 TOCs which in the same year had a negligible £219 million invested in the rail business. This meant that their 2.8% on sales translated into a starry 121.6% return on capital, a figure well above the expectations of return in a heavily levered private equity fund. As private equity knows, the only way to get operating ROCE above 25% is by persuading somebody else to supply most of the capital so that fund returns are levered. This is the explanation for the 121.6% ROCE of the TOCs because, from a rail system point of view, Network Rail is supplying the capital so that the TOCs can earn profits. As Exhibit 2 shows, Network Rail has £35.8 billion of capital invested in infrastructure so that its pre-tax return on sales of 7.6% translates into a return on capital of

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15 Dataset accompanying the ATOC report.
1.3% which the financial markets would deem inadequate. If we then counterfactually reintegrate the system by combining Network Rail and TOC accounts for 2011-12, the system-wide return on capital is just 2.1% ROCE (because railways cannot recover costs from users, whether under public or private ownership).

Exhibit 2: A comparison of capital employed, profit, return on sales and return on capital employed\(^{12}\)

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>Long-term debt and shareholder equity £m</th>
<th>Pre-tax profit £m</th>
<th>Pre-tax return on sales %</th>
<th>Pre-tax return on capital employed %</th>
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<td>Train operating companies</td>
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<td>Network Rail</td>
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<td>7.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<td>Counterfactual: Network Rail and TOCs combined</td>
<td>36,065</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Is there any justification for TOC profits? What’s important is not the size of the margin per se but whether the 2-3% TOC charge on revenue and more than 100% return on capital is the price that has to be paid – is appropriately paid – for efficient management of train operations. The ATOC report does not ask this question, because the question does not enter the frame. So what’s the right answer?

In our report we argued that private ownership, profits and dividends are quite unnecessary. First, we noted that state-owned, vertically integrated, British Rail had a commendable record of operating efficiency in its latter days in the 1980s (p. 138). Second we suggested that the state-owned Directly Operated Railways (DOR) is a crucial and contemporary test. This is because its management currently delivers high levels of performance on the East Coast main line (pp. 127-8) without profit incentives – and after private franchisees have walked away. KPMG chooses not to engage with either of these points.

So whether the public needs private and profit-earning TOCs is, to put it mildly, an open question and the rail regulator certainly needs to cap TOC returns on capital. But more fundamentally, KPMG and ATOC do not engage with the main thrust of our report which is that privatisation is a charade or pretence sustained by subsidy churnaround which suits the TOCs (because it gives them an option on profits) and suits the Department for Transport (DfT) (because its political masters would otherwise have to admit failure as franchising collapsed). Thus the KPMG report makes great play of the fact that (direct) subsidies to the TOCs have declined. But it does not recognise that this is a completely meaningless indicator. This is because, as The Great Train Robbery argues, indirect subsidy of TOCs via low track access charges has increased as direct subsidy has declined. Indeed this has reached the point where indirect subsidies are now typically much larger than direct subsidies (pp. 75-9). The cost of this arrangement falls on the public in ways not considered in the KMG report. Since focus of the latter is in vindicating the TOCs, it has no interest in analysing the larger issue of how taxpayers and citizens are paying to subsidise Network Rail and guaranteeing its debt. This is the crucial fact that is hidden in the shadows of the trade narrative. Public operating subsidy of Network Rail has increased from £1bn in 2002 to £4.5bn a year since 2006 (p. 75). At the same time Network Rail has meanwhile financed the cost of rail investment (not covered by operating subsidy) by issuing some £30bn of public debt. Consequently, Network Rail is now spending more on debt service than on track maintenance (p. 85).

But the KPMG report is silent on this mess. We conclude that public costs do not matter to the TOCs as long as they retain a franchising system which minimises their risk and gives them an option on private profit. This is frightening. And it also points to an even larger problem. It suggests that this is what is likely to happen if you entrench private corporate interests in a utility with an operating cost recovery problem and a large investment requirement. We can then expect the private trade narrative to accentuate the positive in ways that obscure proper discussion of the public interest. In the case of rail, the trade narrative won’t talk about – has no space for – the fact the Network Rail’s debt mountain, already growing, will in due course become unsustainable.

Richard Branson’s “mission impossible” on the West Coast line.

“We were told that it was ‘mission impossible’ and our plans were laughed at by critics. ....

[However 15 years later]...Under our stewardship, the West Coast Main Line has been transformed from a public liability into a valuable asset for the UK, worth many billions of pounds. The service is a British success story and one to put up against rail companies around the world” (Richard Branson, Virgin press release, summer 2012)\(^{13}\)

The turnaround story is the same but the rhetorical techniques are very different in Richard Branson’s *Guardian* article of June 2013. This was a reply to a critical *Guardian* column by Aditya Chakrabortty who cited our *Great Train Robbery* report’s conclusions about Virgin on the West Coast main line. Branson’s response reworks a narrative which is a kind of imaginary previously invoked in a Virgin press release of summer 2012 (quoted in the GTR report p 18) issued after Virgin lost the first round of a West Coast refranchising competition. The 2012 press release and the 2013 *Guardian* article frame Virgin as the corporate hero succeeding against the odds after it embarked on “mission impossible” by taking on the West Coast franchise in 1997. The Virgin group of companies represent themselves as entrepreneur battlers, outsiders disrupting stuffy businesses such as music, airlines, banking, cola or railways in order to give the consumer the Virgin brand and a better deal than that available from larger incumbents. Tom Bower’s (2000, p 237) biography presents a less heroic account of a “protecting the downside” *modus operandi*. Here Branson is described as a serial deal-maker who seeks to maximise business opportunity and minimise risk. But the battler self-image is what Richard Branson himself wants to, or does believe, when he says: “we basically look at which businesses are taking the consumer for a ride, which are making excess profits. We ask: can we do it differently than they are doing it” (Bower, 2000, pp279-80).

From this point of view, the awkward primary problem with UK railways was that they were not making excess profits either before or after privatisation. Instead they were making ineradicable losses because there is never enough money in the fare box to cover operating costs, maintenance, and new investment in track and trains (which the private sector will not fund without guaranteed returns). When Virgin won the West Coast franchise in 1997, the subsidiary problem was that nationalised BR was already running an efficient operating business and profits could not be achieved by further cost cutting. As we pointed out in the *Great Train Robbery* report, on the West Coast main line Virgin did in the long-term carve out a privately profitable niche for West Coast Trains. As we have noted above, like other TOCs it did so at minimal downside risk because it had very little capital invested in the business, and that capital earned a stellar return. But Virgin’s profits came at the expense of continuing large state subsidies which were increasingly concealed from the tax paying public. As we have noted above, this was because of a political decision to provide *indirect* subsidy by lowering the track access charges paid by West Coast and other Train Operating Companies to run their trains. Analysis of this one company case therefore powerfully clarifies the general issues around the increasing reliance of train operators on indirect subsidy in a sector where profit is politically constructed.

The basic source for our argument is the accounts of West Coast Trains filed at Companies House. This company is a special purpose vehicle which has held the West Coast main line franchise since 1997 and is jointly owned by Stagecoach and a chain of Virgin companies which ends in the British Virgin Island-registered Virgin Group Holdings. Sixteen years of accounts are now available and all these years are presented in Exhibit 3 below so readers can inspect and make their own calculations. In the *Great Train Robbery* report we adjusted for inflation and
presented real values; to remove any cause for dispute, the table below presents nominal figures as given in the original West Coast Trains accounts.

Exhibit 3: **West Coast Trains, direct subsidy, depreciation, profit, tax and dividends**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gross direct State subsidy £000</th>
<th>Premium payments £000</th>
<th>Net direct subsidy £000</th>
<th>Depreciation £000</th>
<th>Pre-tax profit £000</th>
<th>Tax £000</th>
<th>Net profit £000</th>
<th>Dividends £000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>72,250</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>72,250</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>-11,181</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-11,181</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 (11 months)</td>
<td>70,236</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70,236</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>9,724</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>9,274</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 (53 weeks)</td>
<td>71,913</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71,913</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>38,042</td>
<td>15,415</td>
<td>22,627</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>59,511</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>59,511</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>52,521</td>
<td>15,220</td>
<td>37,301</td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>93,241</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>93,241</td>
<td>1,681</td>
<td>38,539</td>
<td>13,488</td>
<td>25,051</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>263,008</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>263,008</td>
<td>3,687</td>
<td>69,820</td>
<td>21,368</td>
<td>21,048</td>
<td>69,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>360,496</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>360,496</td>
<td>4,745</td>
<td>66,782</td>
<td>21,845</td>
<td>44,937</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>370,818</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>370,818</td>
<td>5,961</td>
<td>24,881</td>
<td>4,912</td>
<td>19,969</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>212,061</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>212,061</td>
<td>11,756</td>
<td>30,135</td>
<td>9,769</td>
<td>20,366</td>
<td>25,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>92,770</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>92,770</td>
<td>6,305</td>
<td>-13,276</td>
<td>-5,013</td>
<td>-8,263</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>98,746</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>98,746</td>
<td>2,604</td>
<td>16,668</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td>10,568</td>
<td>13,132</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>161,905</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>161,905</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>81,254</td>
<td>24,799</td>
<td>56,455</td>
<td>64,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>127,945</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>127,945</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>104,548</td>
<td>28,123</td>
<td>76,425</td>
<td>74,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>77,518</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77,518</td>
<td>1,587</td>
<td>69,440</td>
<td>18,808</td>
<td>50,632</td>
<td>67,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>76,833</td>
<td>155,270</td>
<td>-78,437</td>
<td>2,665</td>
<td>55,712</td>
<td>15,764</td>
<td>39,948</td>
<td>30,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 (56 weeks)</td>
<td>69,258</td>
<td>214,320</td>
<td>-145,062</td>
<td>2,128</td>
<td>40,775</td>
<td>10,989</td>
<td>29,786</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1997-2012</td>
<td>2,278,509</td>
<td>369,590</td>
<td>1,908,919</td>
<td>45,544</td>
<td>674,384</td>
<td>202,037</td>
<td>444,943</td>
<td>459,814</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This means that they are slightly different from those in the **Great Train Robbery** report, but this does not change our story in any important way. As we have already noted, Richard

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14 Source: West Coast Trains Limited, 'Director's report and financial statements', various years. Company registration number 3007940.

15 The presentation of the notes to the accounts mean that 1997-2010 gross subsidy is a net figure and include the net summation of items that reflect various arrangements including 'Revenue Adjustment' and other amendments. From 2011 the company explicitly state as a separate line 'Franchise (expense)/Income'.
Branson argues that West Coast’s success owes much to “hard work” and the company does not depend on “handouts”. But, if we consider West Coast Trains as a long-term investment, over the life of the franchise since 1997, the company has been dependent on direct subsidy (even without considering indirect subsidy via low track charges). This means that, over the life of the franchise from its own accounts, Virgin is subsidy-dependent and works by extracting value rather than bringing investment into the rail industry.

As Exhibit 3 shows, since 1997 West Coast Trains has benefited from a huge direct public subsidy which (after allowing for offsetting premium payments) amounts to £1.9 billion net. This company operates in a space of politically constructed profit because, without this direct subsidy, the £674 million of cumulative profit could not have been found over 16 years. Indeed, the £202 million West Coast Trains then paid as corporation tax on profits could be understood as simply the recycling of a small part of the much larger state subsidy back to the state; because the profit on which tax is paid comes from the state not the market. In line with standard Train Operating Company practice, more or less all of the post-tax profit, some £460 million over sixteen years, has been extracted from the rail industry as dividends remitted to the corporate parents, Stagecoach and Virgin Rail Group. As we suggested above, the operating company’s value extraction is not offset by investment which would bring new funds into rail. That this is the case is clear, because any large investment by West Coast Rail would reveal itself in depreciation charges much larger than the £46 million cumulatively taken over the life of the franchise.

Richard Branson’s argument is that today’s taxpayer is now getting something in return. This is because the steady profits at West Coast have been accompanied by a dramatic reduction in direct state subsidy (which has fallen hugely from the crisis peak after the collapse of Railtrack) so that West Coast Trains is now paying more in premiums than it obtains as direct subsidy. The problem is that this is just like the story told by ATOC. The narrative of turnaround and contribution focuses only on direct subsidy. It entirely fails to engage with the argument made in The Great Train Robbery that we have rehearsed above: that track access charges paid to Network Rail have fallen steeply. It fails, that is, to talk about the large indirect subsidy which supports the profitability of the TOCs – including West Coast Trains. Track charges for the TOCs no longer reflect the economic costs of infrastructure.

As we noted above, after 2004 direct state subsidies in the form of cash grants to West Coast Trains and other operating companies have declined, but the indirect subsidies in the form of low track access charges levied by Network Rail have increased. West Coast Trains now pays less in track access charges despite the fact that the company is running more trains with more passengers along a line that has been upgraded and renewed at cost of nearly £10 billion – a cost that was substantially charged to the taxpayer. Again, time-series empirics are helpful and Exhibit 4 below pieces together the fragments of available evidence from West Coast Trains’ annual reports and Office of Rail Regulation sources. This shows how, since 2004 on the West Coast line, the number of timetabled train kilometres has doubled to 36 million but track access charges have been nearly halved since the 2004 peak of £280 million; the result is that West
Coast which paid £10 per train kilometre travelled as recently as 2008 is now paying less than £5.

**Exhibit 4: West Coast Trains time-series comparison of track access charges and direct subsidy**

*(Nominal data)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Track access costs £000s</th>
<th>KM miles KM mill.</th>
<th>Cost per KM £</th>
<th>Direct State subsidies £000s</th>
<th>KM miles KM mill.</th>
<th>Cost per KM £</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>130,160</td>
<td></td>
<td>72,250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11 months) 1998</td>
<td>120,779</td>
<td></td>
<td>70,236</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(53 weeks) 1999</td>
<td>133,712</td>
<td></td>
<td>71,913</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>131,923</td>
<td></td>
<td>59,511</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>116,275</td>
<td></td>
<td>93,241</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>239,051</td>
<td></td>
<td>263,008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>261,133</td>
<td></td>
<td>360,496</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>279,964</td>
<td>18.19</td>
<td>15.39</td>
<td>370,818</td>
<td>18.19</td>
<td>20.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>136,495</td>
<td>20.02</td>
<td>6.82</td>
<td>212,061</td>
<td>20.02</td>
<td>10.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>158,832</td>
<td>22.46</td>
<td>7.07</td>
<td>92,770</td>
<td>22.46</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>210,247</td>
<td>22.68</td>
<td>9.27</td>
<td>98,746</td>
<td>22.68</td>
<td>4.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>257,384</td>
<td>24.25</td>
<td>10.61</td>
<td>161,905</td>
<td>24.25</td>
<td>6.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>152,752</td>
<td>30.01</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>127,945</td>
<td>30.01</td>
<td>4.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>170,552</td>
<td>35.55</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>77,518</td>
<td>35.55</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>136,700</td>
<td>35.59</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>76,833</td>
<td>35.59</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(56 weeks) 2012</td>
<td>161,175</td>
<td>35.88</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>69,258</td>
<td>35.88</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1997-2012</td>
<td>2,797,134</td>
<td>244.63</td>
<td>11.43</td>
<td>1,287,854</td>
<td>244.63</td>
<td>5.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Richard Branson’s *Guardian* article briefly recognises these issues before trying to explain them away. It notes that national track access charges for use of infrastructure by Train Operating Companies have been more or less halved in the past decade before explaining that track access charges “are set by the government, and the west coast charges reflect a reduction in costs after the renewal and upgrade work.” This explanation is fact followed by an (incredible) excuse typical of trade narrative in its denial mode. As the *Great Train Robbery* report details,

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16 West Coast Trains Limited ‘Director’s report and financial statements’, various years and ‘National Rail Trends’ (NRT), Office of Rail Regulation.
the fact is that lower track access charges were politically expedient for the Treasury because they keep the costs of rail subvention out of the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (and, incidentally, prevented collapse of the franchising system as franchisees walked away). But, a subsidy is a subsidy regardless of why and how it is politically decided and, if government sets charges below economic costs, then this is a subsidy that will make operating businesses such as West Coast Trains look good. It is nonsense to argue that lower track access charges are economically justified because they reflect “a reduction in costs after renewal and upgrade”. The logic points in the opposite direction. An economic charge for West Coast track access would be higher if it were – as it should – to include an element to recover the capital cost of nearly £10 billion spent on the upgrade. Without that cost recovery, lower track access charges cast Network Rail in the role of the philanthropic landlord who first improves your flat at his expense and then reduces the rent so you can keep more of your income.

We have concentrated on the issue of subsidy dependence by laying out time-series evidence because it is important to justify the central charge which Branson denies because it does not fit his imagery of the battler and “mission impossible”. But finally we would offer a broader view of the discrepancy between a trade narrative account of West Coast Trains where only the positives appear and a more balanced public interest view of West Coast Trains where the large negatives must figure prominently. Exhibit 5 presents figures that correspond to the visible ATOC trade narrative on the one hand, and the figures for indirect subsidy that are ‘shadowed’ or partially concealed in that trade narrative on the other. The cumulative totals for different items give whatever we know from publicly available sources for all or part of the whole period from 1997-2012.

Firstly, in the West Coast Train trade account, since 1997 the visible elements will include the stakeholder rewards which include franchise payments of £370 million cumulative together with the dividend payments to investors of £450 million cumulative. Secondly, again in that trade narrative, the sources of revenue will be recognised, with passenger fares being the largest source accounting for £7,834 million cumulative, supplemented by direct government subsidy of £1,909 million cumulative. Trade figures such as Branson will gloss such figures by noting that dividends have not been paid every year and government direct subsidy is declining. Critics, like us, might argue that even in this trade narrative frame, the relativities and relations should be a matter of public concern. The cumulative direct subsidy of nearly £2 billion is more than five times as large as franchise premium payments, while premium payments are smaller than payments to investors of £450 million which, on the evidence of the East Coast line are not necessary.
Exhibit 5: West Coast Trains source of capital, income, subsidies and franchise and dividend payments

1997-2012: Franchise premium £370m

1997-2012: Dividends £450m

1997: Virgin Rail Group loan to WCT = £20m

1997-2012: Passenger revenue £7,834m

1997-2012: Direct (Govt) subsidy £1,909m

West Coast Trains Direct income

1998: Virgin Rail Group sell 49% of the company to Stagecoach PLC for £147m (Plus Stagecoach issue a £20m loan to Virgin Rail Group)

Indirect subsidy 1997-2012 Total unknown
2011-12 total track access cost was £454m
Virgin Trains paid £160m (Govt) subsidy = £294m

West Coast Mainline upgrade: Cost = £9bn (Funded by Network Rail)

Network Rail Borrowing

17 Virgin Rail Group, West Coast Trains parent company also owned and operated the inter-city Cross Country franchise from 1997 until 2007.
More seriously, the trade narrative leaves much that is negative either invisible or excused (and the problem is compounded by inadequate public disclosure of sums paid by individual companies in track access charges). Thus the £9 billion cost of upgrading the West Coast line is ignored or excused on the grounds that it is rectifying a deficit of maintenance which is a legacy of the bad old days of British Rail. Then there is the indirect subsidy through lowered track access charges which is the apparent precondition of West Coast Trains’ profitability. It is a matter of public concern that until 2010-11 the ORR did not publish information in a form that would allow us to calculate the cumulative indirect subsidy given to each company via low track access charges. However, the DfT did release ‘Cost of running the railway network’ on 21st December 2012 which allocated the Network Rail grant to each TOC. The DfT study shows that in 2011/12 West Coast Trains indirect subsidy via Network Rail’s was £294m, making it the third highest recipient, after Northern Rail and First Great Western, and equating to 30.5% total costs.

There are also several other public interest matters that have never been publicly discussed because they only emerge after close, expert scrutiny of the accounts of West Coast and associated companies. Most remarkable are the initial capitalisation and resale of the West Coast Trains special purpose vehicle in 1997-8. In 1997 West Coast Trains was capitalised with a £20 million loan from Virgin Rail Group. The next year, in 1998, the Stagecoach accounts show that the shareholders of Virgin Rail Group, owners of West Coast Trains, sold a 49% shareholding to Stagecoach for £147 million. It is difficult to argue that this £127 million capital gain was a reward solely for hard work. Indeed, it looks more like a failure by government to control windfall profit-taking.

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19 http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/server/show/ConWebDoc.10814 (The ORR estimate the level of indirect subsidy at £294m in 2011/12).
Conclusion

There’s a tussle going on. It is a tussle about how to manage a railway network. It is an argument about profits and profitability. It is a disagreement about how to think about railways and the way in which they get organised. But it is an argument with wider economic and political ramifications too, because it also a disagreement about how what should count as the public good gets – or should get – framed.

So how should we manage a railway network? And what is the place for profit in that system? As we have noted above, on several occasions polls have shown the public thinking that the railways should be renationalised. This is certainly the view of many of the Trades Unions, and indeed of the Green Party. And there is a strong case for this which we have touched on above and not least because Directly Operated Railways have run the East Coast main line service within the public sector and run it well. However, on the issue of ownership we are agnostic. We are more interested in how the railway system might be organised fairly and transparently than we are with ownership as such. Within the British context our railways require direct subsidy to the tune of around £3.9bn a year\(^2\), and Network Rail has separately funded investment by issuing debt which must now be serviced. This means that there is a funding gap of at least £9 billion each year (without considering debt service charges.) If we start from this as a fixed point, then we need to ask: how should our railways be subsidised? And where should those subsidies go? But at the moment, as a nation, we’ve got the answers to both of these questions wrong.

How should we subsidise them? At the moment the answer is: by way of a daft fudge. Part of the subsidy is paid directly by the DfT. That’s the transparent bit. And part comes from borrowing by Network Rail which issues publicly guaranteed private debt. That’s the part that isn’t transparent. And it’s also building up trouble for the future because the large, publically guaranteed, debt overhang for Network Rail is unsustainable in the long run. To be fair, no one in the industry, TOCs, ROSCOs or Network Rail, is responsible for this idiocy. The Treasury has created the problem within a frame of PSBR rules where off-public balance sheet liabilities do not count. But as things stand, those rules lie at the core of the absence of transparency that afflicts the railway system.

That’s the upstream part of the problem. But this feeds downstream. It feeds into where the subsidies go. And the answer is that it’s the TOCs that are benefiting. They get varying degrees of subsidy directly from the DfT. We can debate the franchising arrangements, and clearly these are flawed. Nevertheless the subvention here is transparent, it’s above board, and it can indeed be easily debated. The bit that isn’t above board is the subsidy that comes from Network Rail. As we’ve shown above, the TOCs don’t pay an economic rent to run their trains. Instead they’re

\(^2\) http://www.networkrail.co.uk/uploadedFiles/networkrailcouk/Contents/Publications/Annual_report_and_accounts/2012/NRL_AR2012.pdf

CRES response to ATOC’s ‘Growth and Prosperity’ report
being indirectly subsidised. This again is scarcely the fault of any of the players in the industry, but it’s a windfall operating gain as a consequence of Treasury and DfT decisions which lead to opacity.

Here’s where the TOCs become players. They’re being subsidised both directly and indirectly. But it serves their purpose to deflect attention from the indirect part of the subsidy. For several reasons. It helps them to make a profit. And it helps them to create trade narratives about their operations in which they present themselves as go-getting entrepreneurs that are in the business of creating value. But they aren’t entrepreneurs in any Marshallian risk-taking sense. As we argued above and in The Great Train Robbery, they are renting trains and (subsidised) track slots, and they are running their services more or less well. But what they aren’t doing is putting any substantial amount of capital at risk either in the operating SPV or in the parent companies which does not guarantee franchise payments in loss making franchises. The downside risk is limited as long as franchisees can walk away from unprofitable franchises with a net gain even if franchise rule changes impose higher penalties which are now making this more expensive. No doubt train operating companies deserve to be paid some kind of fee for management services. We can debate whether 3% or 1% of turnover is the right level. But what they don’t deserve is a stellar return on capital without taking risk.

This is the point where the trade narratives that accentuate the positive and eliminate the negative start to become politically dangerous for the rest of us who participate not only as fare-paying rail users but also as taxpayers and as voters deliberating between different party agendas. A trade narrative is a story that tells how private interest coincides with and helps to enhance the public good. It is motivated by the need to align the two. Or, more negatively, it is motivated by the need to frame the public good in a way that coincides with the pursuit of private interests. Of course some trade narratives are persuasive for good reasons. In the abstract there is no intrinsic reason why private interest and public good cannot sometimes be aligned. Even so, when citizens and voters are faced with trade narratives they need to be wary. The question is always about what trade narratives leave undisclosed as shadowy negatives, or what they excuse and explain away as no problem or as somebody else’s fault.

And this has been the core of the argument that we’ve made above. We have suggested that the TOC trade narratives work by marginalising one of the most important parts of the railway finance story. This is because they make no space for Network Rail’s hidden subsidy – the uneconomic track fees that it charges the TOCs. As a part of this, they make no space to talk about the growth of Network Rail’s debt. And, again as a part of this, they avoid talking about what might happen in due course when that mountain of debt becomes more unsustainable; as we have pointed out, Network Rail is already spending more on debt service than it spends on track maintenance. And these negatives are in the shadowy area of the undisclosed in the TOCs trade narrative because if the negatives were taken seriously it would do them reputational damage. It would put their profits at risk, threaten their business model which is levered on state subsidy, and raise questions about the entrepreneurial story which lies at the core of their sheltered businesses. Perhaps they believe they are swashbuckling entrepreneurs, or perhaps
they don’t. It doesn’t really matter. They are actually in a risk-free business, but they cannot afford to acknowledge that this is the case.

And then there is what might be called the secondary political effects. This is because the independent civil service cannot safeguard the public interest if it has become an uncritical consumer of trade narratives. The Treasury and the DfT are entirely complicit in what’s going on in rail because, as Richard Branson notes, it is successive governments (New Labour and Coalition) that set the rules of the game. But the absence of transparency then has friends on every side because the civil service can avoid blame by celebrating privatised success (and preventing embarrassing failures), while the trade narratives bolster rules and decisions which deflect attention from awkward negatives that don’t fit. Furthermore, when politicians and civil servants endorse trade narratives, what they say circulates widely and helps to shape what can be said – or said and taken seriously – in the public domain. Which, to repeat the point, is why we need to be exceptionally wary of trade narratives.

The corruption of politics is completed when the work of the trade associations is redefined, in the post-Thatcherite style, as lobbying supported by a trade narrative. Trade associations have an honourable place in our polity if their pursuit of private interests is moderated by some recognition of where private and public interests can and do diverge. But this is exactly what trade associations like ATOC or the British Banking Association cannot do. ATOC would be truly worthy of respect if it wrestled in public with the down-side of the present arrangements. It would be truly worthy of respect if it commissioned reports that were seriously researched. It would be truly worthy of respect if it didn’t cherry-pick positives from the available statistics in order to confect a case for the present unsustainable status quo. It would be truly worthy of respect if the stories that it told worked to increase rather than to decrease transparency. But that is not how it has been up till now. And the damage to transparency – and to public debate about how to think about how to run a sustainable railway – has been very serious.

Democracy requires deliberation and it cannot flourish when trade narratives are allowed to define what counts as the public good in a world where private interests and the common good often do not coincide. The idea of ‘regulatory capture’ is familiar from public choice theory. Here the mass of the population has no material incentive to resist the focused depredations of individuals or small groups. After considering sectors like rail and finance, we would propose a different concept of narrative capture which works through story-telling. This can be pervasive and insidious because it defines what can be said and taken seriously (or not) by political elites and masses. And this is close to what has happened in the UK for the railways and public policy. Fortunately we aren’t quite there. The ORR report we cited above gestures at Network Rail’s future financial problems. Independent experts such as Roger Ford and Christian Wolmar have respected positions which allow them to stand back, ask dispassionate questions and present informed arguments. Parts (but only parts) of the daily and regional press have also asked awkward questions, and the trade press is well aware of the difficulties. But ATOC has thus far refused to step outside its trade narrative. And political debate about the consequences of
Network Rail’s deficit has been confined to the margins. This is narrative capture or something very close to it. It is bad for our railways. And it is bad for democracy.